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NOTES
THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION IN MISSOURI
This note is the first in a series which examines the use of extraordinary
writs in Missouri. Notes on quo warranto and mandamus will appear
in the Fall issue, and certiorari and habeas corpus will be discussed in
subsequent issues of the Law Quarterly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy whereby a court or official
about to commit an act judicial in nature is ordered not to do so, on the
ground that such court or official is acting without or in excess of juris-
diction. The history of the use of prohibition in the common law ex-
tends back to the twelfth century.' Missouri courts applied the writ at
common law, relying upon treatises, foreign cases and eventually their
own precedent to characterize prohibition,2 but in 1895 the Missouri
legislature enacted a statute dealing with prohibition and the procedure
for its issuance. Although the fundamental aspects of prohibition
were codified, the statute, virtually unchanged in subsequent codifica-
tions, is essentially a reflection of the common law doctrines.4
1. Accounts of the history of prohibition, of varying length and detail, are in-
cluded in F. Fmuus, THE LAW OF ExTRAoRDiNARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1926); J.
HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1896); W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1923); Hughes & Brown, The Writ of Prohibition, 26 GEO.
LJ. 831 (1938).
2. In Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232, 246-51 (1865), which the court believed to be
the first time prohibition had been petitioned in Missouri, Blackstone and English
cases were cited to indicate the nature of the writ and its applicability to the facts at
hand. The court then used other American cases to indicate that prohibition could
lie in United States courts as well as English ones.
3. Mo. LAWS 95 (1895).
4. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 530.010 to 530.090 (1969). There are two other statutory
provisions which mention prohibition. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.150 (1969) provides
for prohibition against certain decisions of administrative agencies. According to Casby
v. Thompson, 42 Mo. 133 (1868), the word "prohibition" used in GEN. STAT. 1865,
ch. 167, § 24 (1866), now Mo. REv. STAT. § 526.030 (1969), does not refer to the
writ of prohibition, but to the general character of injunction.
Washington University Open Scholarship
512 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1972:511
When dealing with prohibition, the attorney should keep in mind
two theories on the use of the writ.5 The traditional line of thought
emphasizes the extraordinary nature of prohibition, stressing that the
writ is intended for use only in extreme cases when there is clearly no
other adequate remedy for the relator.6 The second theory relies upon
the preventive character of the writ: prohibition should be liberally al-
lowed in order to avoid useless suits, to minimize inconvenience, and
to grant relief at the earliest possible moment in the course of litigation.
This approach appears to be on the ascendency in some states.7
Missouri courts have uniformly embraced the view that prohibition
is extraordinary.8 In the long history of the use of the writ in Mis-
souri, the state's courts have exercised restraint in defining the scope of
use of prohibition, and have rejected any suggestion that the writ
should be a panacea for a multitude of legal woes suffered by litigants.
Thus, opinions emphasize that prohibition is not intended to substi-
tute for error or appeal,' although a few courts have allowed the writ
when appeal was available but less effective.10 The preventive nature
5. F. FERRis, supra note 1, at 417.
6. Id. at 429. A sampling of the grounds for refusing to grant prohibition: 1)
absence of jurisdiction is doubtful or the relator has failed to carry the burden of prov-
ing non-existence of jurisdiction; 2) an adequate remedy exists at law; 3) relator
failed to object to the lower court about the lack of jurisdiction; 4) the action of the
court below is already complete; 5) prohibition would be ineffectual, as when the
act of the court below is clearly void and unenforceable; 6) the petition for the writ
is premature; 7) the act below is ministerial or administrative.
7. See Boone, Prohibition: Use of the Writ of Restraint in California, 15 HAST-
TiNGs L.. 161 (1963) for a discussion on the expansion of the writ's use in California.
See Goldberg, The Extraordinary Writs and the Review of Inferior Court Judgments, 36
CALIF. L. REv. 558 (1948). The Washington legislature long ago expanded the ap-
plicability of prohibition in that state, WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 7.16.290 (1961).
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ross Const. Co. v. Skinker, 341 Mo. 28, 106 S.W.2d 409
(1937); State ex rel. Elam v. Henson, 217 S.W. 17 (Mo. 1919); State ex rel. Larew v.
Sale, 188 Mo. 493, 87 S.W. 967 (1905); State ex rel. Dudley v. Lasky, 451 S.W.2d
352 (Mo. App. 1970); State ex rel. Derring Millikin, Inc. v. Meyer, 449 S.W.2d
870 (Mo. App. 1970).
9. See, e.g., State ex rel. Berbiglia, Inc. v. Randall, 423 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1968);
State ex rel. Burns v. Shain, 297 Mo. 369, 248 S.W. 591 (1923); State ex rel. Scho-
enbacker v. Kelly, 408 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. 1966); State ex rel. City of Mansfield
v. Crain, 301 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1957).
10. The strongest assertions that prohibition may lie if another remedy is less
convenient or efficient are found in State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Work-
men's Compensation Comrn'n, 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W.2d 897 (1928); State ex rel. Ellis
v. Elkin, 130 Mo. 90, 30 S.W. 333 (1895); State ex rel. Mack v. Scott, 241 Mo. App.
674, 235 S.W.2d 106 (1950). But see note 9 supra and accompanying text. Mo.
Sup. Cr. R. 84.22 states that: "No original remedial writ, except habeas corpus,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/6
Vol. 1972:511] WRIT OF PROHIBITION 513
of prohibition is strictly construed; the writ will not lie if the lower
court's action is already completed, since appeal is then an adequate
remedy." This note will illustrate that, while court decisions and legis-
lative enactments have expanded certain aspects of prohibition in Mis-
souri, the traditional views on the nature of the writ continue to have
considerable influence in the state courts.
11. PROCEDURE
The proceeding leading to the issuance or denial of the absolute pro-
hibition is a civil action, as it was at common law. 2 The relator, an
individual petitioning for the writ, need not be a party to the judicial
action sought to be prohibited,' 3 but if he is a stranger to the inferior
will be issued by the court in any case wherein adequate relief can be afforded by an
appeal or by application for such writ to a lower court." Nevertheless, courts have
held that this rule is not absolute, State ex rel. Dietz v. Carter, 319 S.W.2d 56 (Mo.
App. 1958); cf. Stemmler v. Einstein, 297 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1957).
11. State ex rel. Strother v. Broaddus, 234 Mo. 358, 137 S.W. 268 (1911). When
an action is complete is difficult to define: Although an injunction has already been
issued, a superior court may prohibit its enforcement, State ex rel. Taylor v. Nangle,
360 Mo. 122, 227 S.W.2d 655 (1950); it appears that when any aspect of a court or-
der is unexecuted, prohibition may be used to intervene and even undo what already
has been done, State ex rel. St. Louis, K. & S. Ry. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S.W. 357
(1896).
12. Blackstone provides a description of the procedure at common law:
The party aggrieved in the court below applies to the superior court, setting
forth in a suggestion upon record the nature and cause of his complaint
. ..upon which, if the matter alleged appears to the court to be sufficient,
the writ of prohibition immediately issues; commanding the judge not to hold,
and the party not to prosecute, the plea. But sometimes the point may be
too nice and doubtful to be decided merely upon the motion: and then,
for a more solemn determination of the question, the party applying for
the prohibition is directed by the court to declare in prohibition; that is,
to prosecute an action, by filing a declaration, against the other, upon a sup-
position, or fiction, that he has proceeded in the suit below, notwithstanding
the writ of prohibition. And if, upon demurrer and argument, the court shall
finally be of the opinion, that the matter suggested is a good and sufficient
ground of prohibition in point of law, then ...the inferior court shall be
prohibited from proceeding further.
3 W. BLAcKS'rONE, COMMENTARIES * 113-14. The procedure was changed consider-
ably by statute, 1 Will. IV, c. 21 (1831).
13. State ex rel. Smith v. Joynt, 344 Mo. 686, 127 S.W.2d 708 (1939); State ex
rel. Drainage Dist. No. 8 v. Duncan, 334 Mo. 733, 68 S.W.2d 679 (1934) (dictum);
State ex rel. Darst v. Wurdeman, 304 Mo. 583, 264 S.W. 402 (1924); State ex rel.
Priest v. Calhoun, 207 Mo. App. 149, 226 S.W. 329 (1920). A stranger also could
petition for the writ at common law in Missouri, Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 233, 247
(1865). The Attorney General may petition for the writ, although a stranger to the
inferior action, State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1965).
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proceedings, he must demonstrate some interest in the outcome of the
litigation.' 4  The respondent in a prohibition hearing is always the
official who allegedly has exceeded his jurisdiction.' 5 The adverse party
in the inferior proceeding is not joined in the prohibition action, although
his attorney often represents the respondent before the superior court.1"
The relator petitions a superior court to hear and decide whether the
lower court or official has jurisdiction to pursue the lower court ac-
tion.'7 The merits of the inferior action are not placed in issue. In re-
sponse to the petition, the superior court issues a preliminary writ of
prohibition to the lower court or official to show cause why the writ
should not be made permanent. In conjunction with the preliminary
order, the superior court also may order the lower court to desist im-
mediately and completely from its prosecution of the case, with any
steps taken in disregard of such an order being void.1 s The function
of prohibition at common law was supervisory, a purpose reflected to-
day by the statutory requirement that the court or official against whom
the writ is issued be "within the jurisdiction" of the restraining court.10
14. State ex reL Helm v. Duncan, 225 Mo. App. 393, 397, 36 S.W.2d 679, 681
(1931):
Upon the same principle [of discretion] it [prohibition] should never issue
when its operation would not in any way affect the rights of a party asking for
it.
See also Bash v. Truman, 335 Mo. 1077, 75 S.W.2d 840 (1934); State ex rel. Terry v.
Holtkamp, 330 Mo. 608, 51 S.W.2d 13 (1932).
15. State ex rel. Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73 (1956); State ex
reL Stroh v. Klene, 276 Mo. 206, 207 S.W. 496 (1918).
16. See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
17. Suggested forms for the various pleadings in prohibition can be found in
MoBARCLE, MissouRr APPELLATE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE AND EXTRAORDINARY REME-
DiEs (1963); M. VoLz, 2 Missou'i PRACTICE §§ 2111, 2121 (1961); C. WHEATON, 10
MISSOURI PRACTICE R. 97.01 to 97.05 (1962). The petition for prohibition should
contain the following: 1) an identification of the inferior action and the judge or
official sought to be restrained; 2) an averment that the relator petitioned the lower
court for a dismissal of the pending action and that the motion was denied; 3) a
statement of the grounds for the motion for dismissal to the lower court; 4) an asser-
tion that the judge or official still has no jurisdiction and that he will proceed in the
lower action unless prohibited; 5) a specific assertion that the relator has no other
adequate and timely remedy, providing reasons why this is so; 6) a prayer for the
issuance of the writ.
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 530.040 (1969); see State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.
v. McMillan, 351 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1961); State ex rel. Pettibone v. Malloy, 330 Mo.
1084, 52 S.W.2d 402 (1932); State ex rel. Knisely v. Board of Trustees, 268 Mo. 163,
186 S.W. 680 (1916).
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 530.020 (1969). See, e.g., State ex rel. Ghan v. Gideon,
119 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App. 1938); State ex rel. Penfield v. Mosman, 130 Mo. App. 124,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/6
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The essential aspects of the petition for the writ20 and the nature of
the subsequent proceedings are outlined in the Missouri statute and
supreme court rules. 21  The prohibition proceeding is initiated by
the relator filing his petition with the superior court, but he first must
provide written notice to the respondent five days prior to the filing, al-
though this notice requirement may be waived in exceptional cases.22
Ordinarily the relator also notifies the adverse party in the inferior ac-
tion, since his attorney often represents the respondent in the prohibi-
tion proceeding. Having met the notice requirements, the relator may
file his petition, which must state facts requisite for the issuance of a
preliminary writ, since the right to that initial order is determined from
the face of the petition.2" Nevertheless, the respondent may file sugges-
tions opposing the preliminary prohibition, although there is no oral
argument before the petitioned court.24  Despite a Missouri rule that
there will be no motions to reconsider a denial of the preliminary writ,
it has been held that a petitioned court has the discretion to reconsider
the denial on such a motion.25
If the superior court issues the preliminary writ, the respondent us-
ually files a return to the order to show cause, or he may simply move
to dismiss or quash. Any allegations of the petition not denied in the
return will be taken as confessed,2 6 and all allegations of the petition
115 S.W. 1041 (1909). The Supreme Court of Missouri may issue prohibition to any
inferior court since it has general superintendence over all state courts, State ex rel.
Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73 (1956). A court of appeal may issue
a writ to circuit courts within its area even though there is no jurisdiction by appeal
because of an excessive jurisdictional amount in dispute. State ex rel. City of Creve
Coeur v. Weinstein, 329 S.W.2d 399 (1959); State ex rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain,
301 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1957).
20. See note 17 supra.
21. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 530.030 et seq. (1969); Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 84.22 et seq.
and 97.01 et seq.
22. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 84.24.
23. See State ex rel. Brncic v. Huck, 296 Mo. 374, 246 S.W. 303 (1922); State
ex rel. Haughey v. Ryan, 180 Mo. 32, 79 S.W. 429 (1904).
24. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 84.24.
25. The court in State ex reL Coffman v. Crain, 308 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1958)
indicated that Mo. Su. CT. R. 84.24 is not an absolute bar to reconsideration of the
petition.
26. State ex rel. Allison v. Barton, 355 Mo. 690, 197 S.W.2d 667 (1946); State
ex rel. Cytron v. Kirkwood, 340 Mo. 185, 100 S.W.2d 450 (1936); State ex rel. Isbell
v. Kelso, 442 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1969). In addition, assertions of the return not
denied in a reply will be taken as true, State ex rel. Reeves v. Brady, 303 S.W.2d 22
(Mo. 1957); State ex rel. May Dept. Stores v. Weinstein, 395 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App.
1965).
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will be considered uncontroverted if a motion to quash is filed.2 7  The
relator may file a reply after the return is filed or move for judgment
on the pleadings. Following the respondent's return to the show cause
order, a hearing on the prohibition petition is held to determine if the
writ should be made absolute. Although it is a denial of due process
to make the writ permanent without notifying the respondent of the
prohibition proceeding,28 neither due process nor the prohibition stat-
ute require a formal hearing and extended oral argument after the
pleadings are submitted. In response to the need for an immediate de-
cision, at least once the Supreme Court of Missouri has conducted an
abbreviated and informal hearing on whether to make the writ absolute."
Moreover, several cases have issued the writ absolutely without a hear-
ing when the facts were admitted on the pleadings and only a question of
law remained at issue.30 When the superior court considers whether
to make the writ absolute, a presumption that the lower court had
proper jurisdiction must be overcome by the relator. 1 Before making
its decision on pleadings and argument, the superior court can refer a
specific controversy of fact to a circuit court, judge, or referee.32
Issuance of the initial order does not require that the petitioned court
make the writ absolute, for if the court decides that there is no ground
to issue absolute prohibition, the preliminary order will be quashed.,"
The Missouri prohibition statute allows the court to grant relief in
accordance with the "principles of law" when making the prohibition
27. State ex rel. Campbell v. James, 263 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1953); State ex rel.
Hopkins v. Stemmons, 302 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App. 1957).
28. For a general discussion of notice in prohibition proceedings, see State ex rel.
Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73 (1956).
29. See Mansur v. Morris, 355 Mo. 424, 196 S.W.2d 287 (1946). Relator filed
prohibition petition in the supreme court only a few days before an election. At issue
was the county court clerk's authority to remove a candidate's name from the ballot.
The court held two informal hearings in order to determine if prohibition should lie.
30. The most extensive discussion of the procedure is found in State ex rel. Rob-
ertson v. Sevier, 342 Mo. 346, 115 S.W.2d 810 (1938). See also State ex rel. Na-
tional Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Seehorn, 354 Mo. 170, 188 S.W.2d 657 (1945); State
ex rel Isbell v. Kelso, 442 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1969); State ex rel. Houser v.
Goodman, 406 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. App. 1966).
31. State ex rel. Elam v. Henson, 217 S.W. 17 (Mo. 1919).
32. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 530.060 (1969). State ex rel McAllister v. Slate, 278
Mo. 570, 214 S.W. 85 (1919) held that the conclusions as to law or facts by a com-
missioner who had heard evidence in a prohibition proceeding referred to him were
not binding, although persuasive.
33. State ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier, 342 Mo. 346, 115 S.W.2d 810 (1938).
[Vol. 1972:511
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permanent.34 Since the statute does not attempt to prescribe the
remedy to be granted, courts may do more than simply decree that
prohibition will lie. One court granting full relief argued that not only
could it make prohibition absolute, but it also could issue a writ of
restitution to restore to the relator what he had lost by the erroneous
judgment below. 35 Other courts also have done more than merely order
an absolute prohibition.3"
In addition, the court hearing a prohibition proceeding may make a
judgment for costs. Earlier cases held that costs were to be assessed
against the relator even if the respondent was restrained by an absolute
decree, since the courts were unwilling to subject either the respondent,
who was a governmental official, or the adverse party in the action below,
who was not involved in the prohibition proceeding, to the burden of
paying costs.37 By process of elimination such reasoning left the re-
fator as the only source of costs, which he was required to pay even if
he prevailed in the prohibition hearing. This outcome was rejected in
State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, 8 in which the Missouri Supreme Court
found it to be "common knowledge" that the respondent judge or offi-
cial was represented before the upper court by the counsel for the ad-
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 530.070 (1969). Such statutory language has allowed the
courts to employ common law and Missouri case law dating from before the statute
was enacted.
35. State ex rel. Rogers v. Rombauer, 105 Mo. 103, 108, 16 S.W. 695, 697
(1891):
In chancery it has been universally recognized that, when the court obtained
jurisdiction of a controversy, it would proceed to do complete justice therein,
though part of the remedy afforded might be of such a nature (for example
the adjustment of damages) as ordinarily would require a hearing in a court
of law.
So, in appellate practice to-day, a writ of restitution to restore appellant
to what he may have lost by reason of an erroneous judgment is properly is-
suable as a part of the mandate to a trial court.
36. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Nomile, 431 S.W.2d 118 (Mo. 1968) (circuit
judge ordered to enter order setting aside injunction); Traveller's Indem. Co. v. Swink,
440 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1969) (circuit judge ordered to dismiss void appeal and to
remand to probate court). In State ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 466, 54 S.W.
494 (1899) the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered the dissolution of an injunction upon
the issuance of the preliminary writ of prohibition.
37. See State ex rel. Kurn v. Wright, 349 Mo. 1182, 164 S.W.2d 300 (1942);
State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v. Reynolds, 245 Mo. 698, 706, 151 S.W. 85, 87 (1912);
State ex rel. Heddens v. Rusk, 236 Mo. 201, 218, 139 S.W. 199, 204 (1911). But see
Ramsey v. Green, 17 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Mo. App. 1929), a case decided well before
State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, 357 Mo. 134, 206 S.W.2d 558 (1947) which antici-
pated its ruling that costs may be assessed against the adverse party below.
38. 357 Mo. 134, 206 S.W.2d 558 (1947).
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verse party in the action below. The court held that this lower court
adversary may be charged with costs if the relator prevails in the pro-
hibition action, for it is the adversary who is most concerned that
jurisdiction be upheld. 9
At common law there was no appeal when a petitioned court de-
clined to make prohibition absolute-one had to petition for the writ
again. Early Missouri cases ruled likewise, holding that since the de-
nial of the writ was discretionary, there would be no appeal.40 Since
the enactment of the 1895 prohibition statute, however, a relator whose
petition has been rejected may either move for a new trial or appeal.41
If a respondent disobeys an absolute rule of prohibition, the order may
be enforced by contempt proceedings.42
m. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRIT IN MiSSOURI
Although prohibition has been used for centuries, several issues sur-
rounding the application of the writ and its scope have remained unre-
solved. Because prohibition was developed originally to protect the in-
terest of the sovereign and was used only in extreme cases, the com-
mon law generally held that granting prohibition was within the discre-
tion of the petitioned court.43 Today, discretion allows courts to insist
that other remedies be pursued when they provide adequate relief, dis-
regarding whether judicial acts were committed in excess of jurisdic-
tion.44 One decision to the contrary has spoken of the writ as a matter
39. Id. at 143, 206 S.W.2d at 563. It must be emphasized that the awarding of
costs is a discretionary matter for the court.
40. State ex rel. Griffith v. Bowerman, 40 Mo. App. 576 (1890); State ex rel.
Smith v. Levens, 32 Mo. App. 520 (1888).
41. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 530.080 (1969).
42. Howard v. Pierce, 38 Mo. 296 (1866).
43. Nevertheless, there were some differences of opinion among common law
judges over the discretionary nature of prohibition. Compare Clay v. Snelgrave, 91
Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B. 1701); Good v. Good, 124 Eng. Rep. 66 (C.P. 1625); Parish
of Aston v. Castle-Birmidge Chapel, 80 Eng. Rep. 215 (K.B. 1615), with Ford v.
Weldon, 83 Eng. Rep. 50 (K.B. 1664); Woodward v. Bonithan, 83 Eng. Rep. 2 (K.B.
1661):
But all the Judges agreed, that the granting of prohibition is not a discre-
tionary act of the Court, but are grantable ex debito justitiae, and they denied
my Lord Hobart's opinion in his Reports 67, which Roll Chief Justice they
said had frequently done before.
44. Prohibition is not writ of right: State ex reL Taylor v. Nangle, 360 Mo.
122, 227 S.W.2d 655 (1950); State ex rel Hettrick Mfg. Co. v. Lyon, 321 Mo. 825,
12 S.W.2d 447 (1928); State ex rel Goodson v. Hall, 228 Mo. App. 766, 72 S.W.2d
499 (1934).
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of right when the inferior court clearly has no jurisdiction and the
relator is not a stranger to the proceedings. 45  The statement was dic-
tum and was offered without citing any Missouri cases, but it may have
been what the rendering court considered a contemporary matter of
fact if not correct legal theory. Since the granting of prohibition is
within the discretion of the court, the only true guidelines for the judges
are justice and the equities of the case at hand. In such a situation the
court is probably most sensitive to the suggestion of the relator that
there is no other adequate relief, for the rejection of the plea without
a reasonable justification could be condemned as arbitrary. In our le-
gal system based upon due process, discretion is not unlimited discre-
tion.4 6
Missouri opinions have evinced some uncertainty whether the relator
must make an initial protest to the lower court on the issue of jurisdic-
tion as a condition precedent to the grant of the writ of prohibition by
the upper court.47 The problem can be acute for the attorney who has
neglected to object to the inferior court. The earlier cases stated the
"inflexible rule" that failure to protest the lack of jurisdiction below
would result in the denial of prohibition in the court above. 48 The
rationale for such inflexibility was the desire to discourage the waste-
ful consumption of the superior court's time on an issue of jurisdiction
which possibly could be resolved below. Nevertheless, exceptions to
the preliminary objection rule have been developed. Obviously no
policy of judicial efficiency was being furthered when a superior court
denied prohibition against a judge or official who asserted in his re-
turn that he always had had jurisdiction: if he still believes he has jur-
45. State ex rel. Cone v. Bruce, 227 Mo. App. 631, 55 S.W.2d 733 (1932). No
other Missouri opinion has cited the case for this proposition.
46. See State ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun, 207 Mo. App. 149, 160, 226 S.W. 329,
333 (1920):
While we are mindful of the fact that the awarding of a writ of prohibition
is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, yet such discretion is
not an arbitrary one, and . . . we cannot, in the instant case, upon the sole
ground of discretion in this court, refuse the relief sought for by the relator,
when it appears that relator is materially affected by the action of a court,
which action, in our view, under the facts and circumstances of this case, is
clearly beyond its jurisdiction.
47. For a brief general discussion of the need to object in the lower court, see
Comment, Necessity of Pleas to Jurisdiction in Lower Court, 42 CoLTJm. L. REv.
295 (1942).
48. Forsee v. Bates, 89 Mo. App. 577, 583 (1901); State ex rel. Jones v. Laughlin, 9
Mo. App. 486, 488 (1881).
Vol. 1972:511] 519
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isdiction, it would have been useless to have brought it to his atten-
tion.19 A second exception to the rule that an initial lower court ob-
jection must be made was allowed when the lack of jurisdiction was
clearly on the face of the record.5° In one opinion, however, the su-
preme court managed to reduce the general rule, with or without ex-
ceptions, to little more than a rule of thumb. After stating that it
agreed with the preliminary objection requirement, the court in State
ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe5' did not apply the condition precedent to
the case before it. The court asserted that, since the writ is discre-
tionary, it could ignore the lack of an initial objection in reaching the
proper decision.5" Since other cases subsequent to McCaffery have
cited its language,5" the opinion's strong emphasis on discretion prob-
ably is not significantly diluted by other later decisions which seem to
recognize the rule or use exceptions to circumvent it.
The two most uncertain and dynamic aspects of the writ of prohibi-
tion are the concepts of jurisdiction and judicial act. As explained in
the first sentence of this note, prohibition lies against judicial acts done
in excess of the jurisdiction of the court or official. Missouri courts
thus have had to clarify the character of a judicial act, which essentially
has involved defining the extent to which prohibition extends to gov-
ernmental bodies outside the judiciary department. Establishing what
is an excess of jurisdiction has been the more uncertain task for the
courts. For the most part, there has been no difficulty defining the
term when jurisdiction over the person or subject matter is lacking.
Problems have arisen, however, in characterizing excess of jurisdiction
49. State ex rel. Henderson v. Cook, 353 Mo. 272, 183 S.W.2d 292 (1944); State
ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Mo. App. 1970);
State ex rel Ramsey v. Green, 17 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. App. 1929).
50. State ex reL American Lead and Baryta Co. v. Dearing, 184 Mo. 647, 84
S.W. 21 (1904); State ex rel. Young v. Oliver, 163 Mo. 679, 64 S.W. 128 (1901);
State ex reL Saint Louis & K. Ry. v. Hirzel, 134 Mo. 435, 37 S.W. 921 (1896); State
ex rel. Kansas City Exch. Co. v. Harris, 229 Mo. App. 721, 81 S.W.2d 632 (1935).
51. 152 Mo. 466, 54 S.W. 494 (1899).
52. Id. at 498. See also State ex rel. Fenn v. Riley, 127 Mo. App. 469, 479, 105
S.W. 696, 699 (1907):
The effect of those and perhaps of other recent decisions is that the refusal
to grant prohibition until the lower court has overruled the plea to its juris-
diction is rather a discretionary matter of practice in the supervising court,
than a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ ....
53. Other cases using broad discretion: State ex rel. Moberly v. Sevier, 337 Mo.
1174, 88 S.W.2d 154 (1935); State ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Williams, 221 Mo. 227,
120 S.W. 740 '(1909); State ex rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain, 301 S.W.2d 415
(Mo. App. 1957).
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when both personal and subject matter jurisdiction are present, but the
judge or official nevertheless has committed an act apparently beyond
his authority. The significant changes in the nature of prohibition
which have occurred have centered in these two areas, and from all in-
dications, important future developments in the law of prohibition will
probably involve the redefinition of these two terms.
In Missouri prohibition can be enforced against a judge or official
who has failed to gain jurisdiction over the person or does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus the relator can use the writ
to test jurisdiction when there has been a defective service of process, 4
no service at all,55 or attempted service of a party immune to process. 56
Similarly, prohibition is used to question the venue of an action.57 Al-
though Missouri courts have had no difficulty allowing prohibition to
restrain courts prosecuting an action without proper venue, they have
differed on whether the writ lies to attack a court order denying or
granting a request for change of venue.58
Prohibition cannot be issued against a lower court on the basis of an
erroneous factual conclusion made during the determination that the
court had jurisdiction or proper venue.59 The writ is intended to ques-
54. State ex rel. Lesliy v. Aronson, 362 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App. 1962) (service on
Missouri resident by the Missouri long arm statute); Burke v. McClure, 211 Mo. App.
446, 245 S.W. 62 (1922) (interested party serving process).
55. State ex rel. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Barnett, 245 Mo. 99, 149 S.W. 311
(1912); State ex rel. Keller v. Porterfield, 283 S.W. 59 (Mo. App. 1926).
56. State ex rel. Stipec v. Owen, 271 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. App. 1954).
57. State ex reL Toberman v. Cook, 365 Mo. 274, 281 S.W.2d 777 (1955); State
ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304 (1951); State ex rel. At-
kinson Paving Co. v. Aronson, 345 Mo. 937, 138 S.W.2d 1 (1940); State ex reL Cum-
mins Diesel Sales Corp. v. Eversole, 332 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1960); State ex rel.
Finch v. Duncan, 195 Mo. App. 541, 193 S.W. 950 (1917).
58. The petition for the writ in such cases is predicated upon the theory that the
judge has exceeded his jurisdictional powers in granting or denying the request. For
cases granting prohibition, see, e.g., State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 365 Mo.
447, 283 S.W.2d 458 (1955); State ex rel. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v.
Bridgeman, 350 Mo. 1021, 169 S.W.2d 697 (1943); State ex rel. Bixman v. Denton,
128 Mo. App. 304, 107 S.W. 446 (1908). But see State ex rel. Kochtitzky v. Riley,
203 Mo. 175, 101 S.W. 567 (1907); State ex rel. Hart v. Mazuch, 68 S.W.2d 923 (Mo.
App. 1934); note 62 infra.
59. State ex reL Fabrico v. Johnson, 293 Mo. 302, 311, 239 S.W. 844, 847
(1922):
It is a general rule, admitting of no exception that we are aware of, that,
where a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, and the
question of its jurisdiction of the person turns upon some fact to be deter-
mined by the court, its ruling that it has jurisdiction, if wrong, is simply er-
ror, for which prohibition is not the proper remedy.
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tion a court's jurisdiction as a matter of law rather than to examine the
correctness of the inferior court's factual determination upon which
legal jurisdiction is based. In such a situation the resolution of the
factual controversy must be tested by appeal.
The concept of jurisdiction in the law of prohibiti6n involves more
than merely deciding if the lower court has jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter and person:
Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental sense means an entire ab-
sence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority
over the subject matter or the parties. But in ordinary usage lack of
jurisdiction is not limited to fundamental situations. For the purpose of
determining the right to restrain by prohibition, a much broader mean-
ing is given. In such proceedings, lack of jurisdiction may be applied
to a case where, although the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties in the fundamental sense, it had no "jurisdiction" or
power to act except in a particular manner or to give certain kinds of re-
lief or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural require-
ments. 0
Simply stated, it is possible for a court to commit an act which may be
prohibited by a superior court even though the lower court has juris-
diction over the subject matter and the parties. 1 The superior court
may characterize the act of the lower court as being "in excess of its
jurisdiction," but the act could perhaps be more accurately described
as an error by the lower court for which appeal is an inadequate remedy.
For example, a judge should not hear a case in which he has a personal
interest; consequently, prohibition will lie to prevent him from hearing
such a case. 62 Similarly, a judge who is transferred from a court district
60. Boone, supra note 7, at 163.
61. See State ex rel Warde v. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 266, 171 S.W. 72, 74
(1914):
[Lack of jurisdiction may exist with reference to subject matter generally
(e.g. the class to which the case belongs) or it may exist with reference to
the parties to the suit, or it may exist with reference to excess of jurisdic-
tion in the concrete case itself.
62. The bias may be legislatively determined, see, e.g., State ex rel. Renfro v.
Wear, 129 Mo. 619, 31 S.W. 608 (1895); or on the strength of evidence, State ex rel.
McAllister v. Slate, 278 Mo. 570, 214 S.W. 85 (1919). Note that some cases have
held that prohibition will not lie when a judge refuses a request to order a change of
venue upon the assertion of personal bias. The writ may be denied on the rationale
that the judge's decision concerning his bias is a matter of discretion to be reviewed as
error on appeal: State ex rel. Ford v. Hogan, 324 Mo. 1130, 27 S.W.2d 21 (1930);
State ex rel. Ward v. Lubke, 29 Mo. App. 555 (1888). Or the writ may be denied
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may be prohibited from committing further judicial acts within that
district. 3
The Missouri courts have rendered numerous decisions in the process
of defining what acts are "in excess of jurisdiction" when fundamental
jurisdiction exists. Some judicial acts are so excessive as a matter of
law that prohibition lies as a matter of course. Thus action by a court
with continuing jurisdiction in a child custody case, but without pro-
viding notice to the parties, will be restrained by prohibition. 64 On the
other hand, courts initially refused to issue prohibition against a court
hearing an action based on an allegedly defective complaint, provided
fundamental jurisdiction was present:
Where jurisdiction over the parties and the subject of the cause is, as in
this case, clear, any error of the trial court in ruling on the sufficiency of
the pleading forming the basis of the suit cannot be corrected by resort
to the writ of prohibition.65
Eventually the Missouri Supreme Court narrowed this broad language
by using prohibition to intervene when the lower court was proceeding
on a complaint which clearly could not state a cause of action.66 Al-
though such an application of the writ may be justified as a device to
correct obvious errors of an inferior court, it nevertheless implies, at
least to some degree, a review of the discretionary decision of the re-
because appeal is an adequate remedy: State ex rel. Brady v. Evans, 184 Mo. 632, 83
S.W. 447 (1904). But see State ex rel. Interstate Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Hall,
409 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1966) (distinguishing Brady). See also note 58 supra.
63. State ex rel. Bickford v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 843, 6 S.W.2d 47 (1928).
64. See, e.g., In re Lipschitz, 466 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. App. 1971) (dictum); State
ex rel. Tatum v. Ramey, 134 Mo. App. 722, 115 S.W. 458 (1909).
65. State ex rel. Hoffmann v. Scarritt, 128 Mo. 331, 340, 30 S.W. 1026, 1028
(1895). Accord, State ex rel. Leake v. Harris, 334 Mo. 713, 67 S.W.2d 981 (1934);
State ex rel. Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Tracy, 237 Mo. 109, 140 S.W. 888 (1911); State
ex rel. McNamee v. Stobie, 194 Mo. 14, 92 S.W. 191 (1906).
66. State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden, 357 Mo. 167, 179, 206 S.W.2d 979,
987 (1947):
Courts recognize the fundamental difference between a situation in which a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, has also the further power to
pass upon a mere insufficiency of allegations in a petition before it to state a
cause of action, and the same court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter,
has before it a petition which is insufficient to initiate and call into being
the exercise of jurisdiction such court possesses.
Accord, State ex rel. National Ref. Co. v. Seehorn, 344 Mo. 547, 127 S.W.2d 418
(1939); State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 98 S.W.2d 677 (1936). The
significance of Johnson, the first of these cases, was noted in Atkinson, The Work of
the Missouri Supreme Court-1936, Appellate Practice, 2 Mo. L REv. 413, 420 (1937).
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spondent that a good cause of action was stated. Theoretically pro-
hibition is not available to question an exercise of discretion,"7 but
courts appear to have allowed the writ to lie in order to afford the re-
lator immediate relief from a patently erroneous decision. Upper
courts have applied prohibition in other situations where it could be
argued that the lower court's action should only be reviewed by appeal:
to advise an inferior court that a complaint did not state a justiciable ac-
tion;68 and to declare a court's joinder of actions improper.°0 The re-
spondent in the latter case urged that he had used his discretion in
joining the actions, but the court of appeals in a somewhat circular
argument stated that the respondent had no discretion to try improperly
joined cases. 70
Nowhere has the willingness to intervene with prohibition been so
evident as in discovery proceedings, despite the presence of fundamen-
tal jurisdiction and an exercise of discretion by the lower court.71 Such
a use of prohibition is justified on the ground that an order for discov-
ery not within the bounds of the Missouri discovery rules is an abuse of
discretion and therefore in excess of jurisdiction.72  The writ has devel-
oped into a device whereby many decisions of a lower court in discovery
proceedings not historically subject to prohibition nevertheless can be
reviewed: to determine if evidence was privileged and therefore to be
protected from discovery;73 to determine if documents requested in an
interrogatory were suitable for discovery;74 to establish if the requested
information was available to the relators and thus subject to discovery; 75
and even to decide if a requested interrogatory was moot.78
67. State ex reL Drainage Dist. No. 8 v. Duncan, 334 Mo. 733, 68 S.W.2d 679
(1934); State ex reL Hog Haven Farms v. Pearcy, 328 Mo. 560, 41 S.W.2d 403
(1931); State ex rel Clark v. Klene, 201 Mo. App. 408, 212 S.W. 55 (1919).
68. State ex rel. Highway Conm'n v. Elliott, 326 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959).
69. State ex reL Gulf Oil Corp. v. Weinstein, 379 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. App. 1964).
70. Id. at 175.
71. See Comment, Prohibition to Prevent Discovery Proceedings, 35 Mo. L. REv.
533 (1970).
72. See, e.g., State ex reL Cummings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W.2d
383 (1949); State ex rel. Mueller v. Dixon, 456 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1970).
73. State ex rel. Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69
(1953).
74. State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963); State ex rel. Woods
v. Kirkwood, 426 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App. 1968).
75. State ex rel. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Rooney, 399 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. App.
1965).
76. State ex rel. H.K. Porter Co. v. Nangle, 405 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App. 1966).
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Concerned with the increasing use of prohibition to review discovery
proceedings, the Missouri Supreme Court recently attempted to nar-
row the scope of the writ's use to question discovery orders.7" The
court employed a "reasonable argument" test in defining those errors
of discretion which are so severe that they are in excess of authority and
thereby subject to prohibitory restraint:
Under these circumstances, we cannot say respondent abused his judi-
cial discretion by deciding the way he did when there is a reasonable
basis shown for his doing so, even if we assume that had he sustained
the objections, there was also a reasonable basis for doing that.78
With such language the supreme court has reduced the scope of the
application of the writ, but without precisely defining the limits of that
scope of review allowed by prohibition. Probably it is impossible to
abstractly define the distinction between an abuse of discretion and an
act in excess of jurisdiction since the particular circumstances of the
case before the court appear to be determinative of whether prohibition
will be made absolute.79
As outlined above, the Missouri courts have insisted that there must
be an excess of jurisdiction before prohibition will lie against a court or
official with fundamental jurisdiction, but it is clear that the courts
have had little success distinguishing excess of jurisdiction from mere
error to be reviewed on appeal. Indeed, a reading of the cases sug-
gests that a more pragmatic test is being used by the judges of peti-
tioned courts to determine if prohibition should be made absolute,
with the finding of an act in excess of jurisdiction a mere fiction to
reconcile the opinion with prior case law and traditional doctrines on
77. State ex rel. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Dowd, 448 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1969): "It
is therefore to be expected that only in unusual circumstances will a circuit judge be
found to have abused his discretion in this field to the point where he should be pro-
hibited." To justify the narrowing of the scope of prohibition, the court asserted that
the appellate courts could not hear the great number of reviews by prohibition, em-
phasized the broad discretion of trial courts, and pointed out the supposed added ad-
vantage which the trial court has in determining the propriety of an interrogatory.
For a description of the reaction in the courts of other states to the use of prohibition
in discovery proceedings, see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1229 (1964).
78. State ex rel. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Dowd, 448 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1969).
79. The Dowd mandate has been cited with approval in subsequent cases, State
ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel. St Louis Land
Clearance Auth. v. Godfrey, 471 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. App. 1971); State ex rel. Mueller
v. Dixon, 456 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1970), but it is clear by Godfrey and Mueller
that prohibition still lies to restrain some discovery orders.
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the writ. When it appears that the relator will be irreparably injured
unless he is allowed an immediate review of the lower court's conduct,
upper courts have been willing to issue prohibition, even if the concept
of excess of jurisdiction must be strained or even distorted. A similar
process apparently is used in election cases, in which theory requires a
finding that an election official or clerk has committed a judicial act.80
In practice, although not in theory, Missouri courts have drifted away
from the "excess of jurisdiction" test toward a criterion that allows
prohibition if no other adequate remedy exists.
The scope of prohibition to review judicial error is not clear from
the Missouri opinions. One solution to the confusion is to recognize
that it is probably impossible to differentiate adequately between er-
ror and abuse of discretion, and to establish guidelines for the use of
the writ based upon whether other adequate remedies for the relator
do or do not exist. The discovery and procedure cases discussed
above, and the election cases reviewed below, indicate that the courts
have already begun to adopt this solution, although not publicly.
In Missouri and in most other jurisdictions, not only must the court
or official be acting in excess of jurisdiction, but also the offending
conduct must be judicial in nature before prohibition will lie. "Judi-
cial act" has been subject to varying interpretations, but it is now ac-
cepted by Missouri courts that the term refers to the character of the
act itself and not to the duties or office of the court or official so acting.
Thus prohibition will not lie to restrain a court's nonjudicial acts such
as effecting the removal of the county seat to another community after
county residents had voted for the move.81 On the same principle,
Missouri courts have long held that bodies outside the judicial depart-
ment can be reached by the writ."2 Despite the clear pronouncements
of these early decisions, subsequent cases deciding whether to apply
prohibition outside the judiciary branch present a confusing pattern,
apparently because the courts blurred and eventually forgot the dis-
tinction between a judicial act and an act by a judicial officer.
Some of the confusion may have been due to the constitutional doc-
trine of separation of powers, as illustrated by the cases involving the
80. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
81. State ex rel. West v. Clark County, 41 Mo. 44, 50 (1867). Similar language
is found in State ex rel. Wulfing v. Mooney, 362 Mo. 1128, 247 S.W.2d 722 (1952)
(dictum); Hockaway v. Newsom, 48 Mo. 196 (1868).
82. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 6 v. Ban-is, 84 Mo. App. 654 (1900) (applied against
board of arbitrators).
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State Board of Health. In an early case concerning the newly created
board, the Supreme Court of Missouri pointed out that the actions of
the health board were "quasi-judicial in their character." 3  The court
later had to deal with that statement in State v. Hathaway,84 when the
plaintiff attacked the statute creating the board on the ground that
there had been an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the
board. In rejecting the argument, the court described the board's du-
ties as ministerial and specifically denied that the body had any judicial
powers.85
The Hathaway court did not emphasize the distinction between an
act judicial in nature and a judicial function vis-a-vis the constitutional
structure of government. This had its natural consequences in a later
case concerning whether prohibition would lie against the Board of
Health's power to revoke a license. In State ex rel. McAnally v.
Goodier, 6 prohibition against the board's investigation of the peti-
tioner was denied because:
The duties of the board are of an administrative or ministerial character
and therefore as long as it acts within the scope of the exercise of a rea-
sonable discretion it is free to act. . . . The writ of prohibition does
not go against such a body. It goes only against a court or tribunal ex-
ercising judicial functions.87
Here the court failed to keep in mind that language of the earlier
Hathaway case 8 was in the context of a constitutional issue rather than
in regard to prohibition. The court apparently failed to see that an act
could be sufficiently judicial in nature for prohibition to lie, yet not be
an act constitutionally reserved for the judiciary. An even more pro-
nounced failure to see that the judicial act concept of prohibition was
not limited to court decisions came soon thereafter in another supreme
court opinion:
83. State ex rel Hathaway v. State Bd. of Health, 103 Mo. 22, 28, 15 S.W. 322,
323 (1891). See also State ex rel. Granville v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 123 (1884).
84. 115 Mo. 36, 21 S.W. 1081 (1893).
85. Id. at 49, 21 S.W. at 1084: "A judicial duty within the meaning of the con-
stitution is such a duty as legitimately pertains to an officer in the department desig-
nated by the constitution as judicial."
86. 195 Mo. 551, 93 S.W. 928 (1906).
87. Id. at 560, 93 S.W. at 930. See also Higgins v. Talty, 157 Mo. 280, 57 S.W.
724 (1900).
88. Note 83 supra and accompanying text.
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If it is part of the judiciary of the state, designated and authorized by the
constitution, then the writ of prohibition can be directed to it upon
proper ground and when proper application, but if it is not part of the
judicial system authorized by the constitution, and is a mere adminis-
trative or executive board of a municipal corporation, then such writ
cannot be directed to it.5 9
Despite these strong assertions of the law, the court only a decade
later in State ex rel. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Harty° clearly
directed its attention to the nature of the act to be restrained and ap-
plied prohibition outside the judiciary:
The right threatened by respondent to be affected was one acquired and
enjoyed in conformity with the law, and its abrogation required not only
a hearing upon the facts, but the exercise of discretion and judgment on
the part of the respondent in its determination. Clothed with these
characteristics, the proposed act must, therefore, be construed as judi-
cial in nature.91
Although three of the six justices refused to concur with these senti-
ments expressed in the court's opinion to Harty, Missouri courts today
would have no trouble applying prohibition outside the judicial de-
partment.92 Possibly the Missouri Supreme Court in the earlier cases
was uneasy about extending prohibition to administrative bodies.
Since their exact nature had not yet been clearly defined in relation to
the various branches of government, such a step would have suggested
that the agencies had judicial powers.
Some relators have attempted to argue that an official, by obeying a
legislative mandate, is committing a judicial act; namely, deciding that
the statute authorizing his conduct is constitutional. This argument
has been roundly rejected by the courts, since an official is bound by
the duties of his office to comply with the statute. 93 An official obey-
ing a statute is therefore making no decision concerning the statute's
89. State ex rel. McEntee v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514, 528, 123 S.W. 1057, 1060
(1909).
90. 276 Mo. 583, 208 S.W. 835 (1919).
91. Id. at 598, 208 S.W. at 839.
92. See State ex rel Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'n,
320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W.2d 897 (1928); State ex rel. Atkins v. State Bd. of Acc'tancy, 351
S.W.2d 483 (Mo. App. 1961). But see State ex rel. Davis v. Peters, 94 S.W.2d 930
(Mo. App. 1936).
93. State ex reL Wulfing v. Mooney, 362 Mo. 1128, 247 S.W.2d 722 (1952) (dic-
tum); State ex rel. Missouri & N. Ark. Ry. v. Johnston, 234 Mo. 338, 137 S.W. 595
(1911); Kalbfell v. Wood, 193 Mo. 675, 92 S.W. 230 (1906).
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constitutionality, and prohibition does not lie against his mere minis-
terial conduct of obedience.
Apparently in an attempt to provide timely relief when no other rem-
edy was easily available, Missouri courts have enforced prohibition in
numerous election controversies, usually involving the presence or ab-
sence of a name on a ballot. There is seldom a discussion of whether
the respondent's act is judicial in nature,94 and it is uncertain that the
courts are requiring the judicial act limitation to be met in these cases.
Several of the opinions which have made prohibition absolute against
election commissioners and officials have emphasized the consequences
if prohibition does not lie: the government's funds may be wasted
upon a void election, or, if the election is not void, those who voted
for the ineligible candidate will have been disfranchised.9 5 The se-
verity of the consequences may be outweighing the need for a clearly
defined judicial act.
Clearly the term "judicial act" has been extended by the courts be-
yond the judiciary, but it is uncertain exactly what the concept does en-
tail. The definition is not so broad to include all determinations of
fact by governmental officers or every decision or exercise of discretion
by a court or official, yet it is not so narrow to include only decisions
in judicial litigation. An early court of appeals opinion applied a
somewhat circular definition of a judicial act: "All acts based upon a
decision, judicial in nature, and affecting either a public or private
right . . . ."' The Harty court spoke of, "the power conferred upon
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Danforth v. Alford, 467 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1971); State
ex rel. Bates v. Remmers, 325 Mo. 1175, 30 S.W.2d 609 (1930); State ex rel. Gold-
man v. Hiller, 278 S.W. 708 (Mo. 1926). But see Mansur v. Morris, 355 Mo. 424,
196 S.W.2d 287 (1946), in which the court explained that the county clerk's power
to correct errors and omissions on ballots was "not purely ministerial." In State ex
rel. Sommer v. Calcaterra, 362 Mo. 1143, 247 S.W.2d 728 (1952), the court suggested
that the prohibited judicial act in most election cases involved conduct based upon the
respondent's own incorrect ("judicial") interpretation of a state election statute or
the compliance with it by a candidate, citing Mansur v. Morris, supra; State ex rel.
Stone v. Thomas, 349 Mo. 22, 159 S.W.2d 600 (1942) (concerning election offi-
cials' interpretation of their power to discharge precinct officers); Bates v. Remmers,
supra. In a recent case, State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1972),
the Supreme Court of Missouri once again applied its novel definition of judicial acts
by election officials. The ultimate effect of cases such as Gralike and Alford is to
allow the relator to question the eligibility of a candidate to run for office by using
prohibition proceedings to resolve factual controversies concerning the candidate's
eligibility.
95. See State ex rel. Danforth v. Alford, 467 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1971); Mansur v.
Morris, 355 Mo. 424, 196 S.W.2d 287 (1946).
96. School Dist. No. 6 v. Barrs, 84 Mo. App. 654, 666 (1900).
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a public officer involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the
determination of questions of right affecting the interests of person or
property. '97  The Missouri legislature did not explicitly use the judicial
act concept in establishing the acts of administrative agencies for
which prohibition will lie: "A decision which. . . determines the le-
gal rights, duties, or privileges of any person, including the denial or
revocation of a license .... ,,98 This statutory language, part of Mis-
souri's Administrative Procedure Act, is determinative, of course, only
in cases involving administrative bodies, but it is indicative of a wil-
lingness to avoid being caught in the semantics of "judicial act" and to
respond to the interests of parties when no other relief is available.
Likewise, the Missouri courts probably were responding to the increas-
ing importance of administrative agencies and the need to provide im-
mediate review of some agency conduct when they construed the con-
cepts of judicial act and excess of jurisdiction to include official acts
outside the judiciary.
Considering the treatment of the term "judicial act" by the courts
and legislature, it is obvious that the definition of the term is molded
as much by the needs of the judicial system for an adequate remedy
in certain situations as by the traditional common law concept of judi-
cial act. Possibly the need for adequate relief should be the sole cri-
terion for determining if prohibition should lie against a particular of-
ficial act. In any case, "judicial act" is now defined broadly enough
by the courts to include nearly any weighing and resolving of a factual
or legal controversy against which the court may wish to intervene.
IV. THE ROLE OF PROHIBITION TODAY
By definition prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, but it can nev-
ertheless be a valuable tool in litigation. One aspect of the philosophy
underlying the writ might be expressed as follows: when all other
remedies fail to offer adequate relief, the writ of prohibition should be
97. State ex rel. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Harty, 276 Mo. 583, 598, 208
S.W. 835, 839 (1919).
98. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.150 (1969):
When any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by
statute or municipal charter or ordinance shall have rendered a decision
which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal rights,
duties or privileges of any person, including the denial or revocation of a li-
cense, and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review of
such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for injunction, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition or other appropriate action. ...
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used as a ground for intervention. 9 Thus, there is an ad hoc charac-
ter to prohibition which renders meaningless any attempt to catalog the
various instances in which the writ is available; a unique situation may
arise at any time warranting the utilization of prohibition to achieve a
just resolution of a controversy. The ability to use prohibition in an
innovative manner has allowed courts to go beyond the definitional
limits for the writ's use established at common law.
The raison d'etre of prohibition is to provide an extemporaneous
remedy when the normal legal channels for relief are insufficient. 100
It is submitted that such a spirit of "relief when it is needed" should
govern the rules concerning the issuance of the writ. Yet countless
Missouri opinions have attempted to establish various conditions pre-
cedent which must exist before the preliminary order will be made ab-
solute, conditions which are divorced from the philosophy of extempor-
aneous relief and are founded in the possibly irrelevant common law
history of the writ.
It is obvious, however, that on other occasions the state's courts
have often responded to the need for immediate and adequate relief
and have reaffirmed the extemporaneous character of prohibition, even
when the circumstances required a disregard of one of the several
traditional prerequisites for issuance of the writ.101 Over the past three
decades the application of prohibition to circumstances foreign to com-
mon law usage has become more frequent. To eliminate the confusion
about the scope of the writ's use, it may be appropriate for both the
courts and the legislature to reassess what should be the character of
prohibition in Missouri.
It is unlikely that either of these branches of government would wish
to reassert the traditional common law limits on the use of the writ,
for prohibition has been too valuable a device in providing relief in
Missouri courts. Rather, it more likely that the scope of prohibition
would be broadened judicially or legislatively. Several alternatives ex-
ist for expanding the use of this remedy.
One method is to redefine "usurpation" or "excess" of jurisdic-
tion.10°  The concept of jurisdiction is sufficiently vague to allow the
99. Cf. State ex rel. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Eby, 170 Mo. 497, 71 S.W.
52 (1902).
100. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
101. See text accompanying notes 65-80 and 84-95 supra.
102. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 530.010 (1969) describes the purpose of prohibition as to
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courts considerable opportunity to redefine the term. As one author
has remarked concerning the use of prohibition in California:
Thus the only conclusions that one can draw from prohibition cases are
...that as new uses for the remedy have been shown, the concept of
jurisdiction has expanded to meet the new uses so that any error which
the reviewing court deems so gross as to warrant its interference is
called "jurisdictional."'' 0 3
A similar process has occurred in Missouri, where the courts have re-
vised the concept of excess of jurisdiction to justify intervention in dis-
covery proceedings. 10 4  This technique of redefinition, however, fails
to directly confront the issue of whether the scope of prohibition
should be extended beyond the common law limits. The natural con-
sequence of attempting to maintain the fiction that one has never part-
ed from the traditional concepts is confusing and conflicting court
opinions.
Another device is to abrogate the judicial act limitation, and have
prohibition lie against the extrajurisdictional acts of a governmental of-
ficial regardless of the judicial or ministerial nature of his conduct.
The judicial redefinition of the concept of jurisdiction entails an ap-
preciable degree of subtlety, while this latter method is an overt de-
parture from the common law. Consequently, courts possibly would
leave such a deviation to legislative enactment, 105 although the Mis-
souri prohibition statute does not specify that the writ will lie only
against judicial acts and is sufficiently broad in language to allow judi-
cial interpretation."0 6 Moreover, the courts have already been active
"prevent the usurpation of judicial power," terminology which has not been given spe-
cial significance by the courts.
103. Goldberg, note 7 supra, at 576.
104. See notes 71-80 supra and accompanying text.
105. Cf. People ex rel. Duchenan v. House, 4 Utah 369, 10 P. 780 (1901) (court
held that territorial legislature had power to provide for prohibition against ministerial
acts).
106. Mo. REv. STAT. § 530.010 (1969):
The remedy afforded by the writ of prohibition shall be granted to prevent
usurpation of judicial power, and in all cases where the same is now appli-
cable according to the principles of law.
Although the first phrase seems to impose a "judicial act" limitation, the latter
phrase appears to indicate an intent by the framers of the prohibition statute to al-
low a reinterpretation or elimination of this requirement when the case law so dictates,
It is doubtful that the term "now applicable" was intended to inhibit the development
of general principles of prohibition law after the enactment of the statute in 1895.
Since the entire chapter establishes only very general guidelines for the use of the writ,
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in innovating new uses for the writ. Nevertheless, if any legislature, or
a court for that matter, acts to eliminate the condition, due regard
must be given the state constitution. 10 7 The Missouri legislature has
already acted to change the scope of prohibition to some degree: The
Administrative Procedure Act allows prohibition to lie against certain
acts of administrative agencies without mention of the judicial act lim-
itation. 0 s
Finally, the courts can continue the expansion of "judicial act" to in-
clude official conduct even more unrelated to the nature of the formal
judicial process. 10 9 As with the judicial revision of the concept of
jurisdiction, there is a danger of opinions which fail to establish defi-
nite guidelines for the further development of the writ's use.
Prohibition is still extensively used in the courts of Missouri. The
primary reason for this vitality of a writ hundreds of years old is the
willingness of the courts to redefine fundamental concepts of prohibi-
tion in response to contemporary demands for relief in situations
which did not exist at common law. Possibly the writ would be even
more efficiently utilized if prohibition's character of ad hoc relief
was emphasized and the historical terminology of "jurisdiction" and
"judicial act" were eliminated. To take such a step would clearly re-
sult in a departure from the established usage of the writ at common
law, but not a deviation from the historical purpose of prohibition to
provide a ground for intervention when no other relief exists. In as-
sessing what should be the contemporary scope of prohibition, one
must keep in mind that our legal system is vastly different from the
courts which first created the extraordinary writs.
the drafters obviously expected the courts to provide extensive interstitial elaboration.
See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 530.090 (1969), which states that the proceedings in pro-
hibition are to "be governed in accordance with the existing rules of general law upon
the subject . .. ."
107. Compare Winsor v. Bridges, 24 Wash. 540, 64 P. 780 (1901) (statute al-
lowing prohibition to lie against ministerial acts declared in conformity with state con-
stitution), with State ex rel. Lee v. Montana Livestock Sanitary Bd., 339 P.2d 487
(Mont. 1959) (similar statute declared invalid by constitution).
108. See note 98 supra.
109. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
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